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There is not a single more unintelligible word in
the English language than republicanism.
-John Adams
The only place where the word "republican" appears in the Constitu-
tion is article IV, section 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every
state in this union a Republican form of government, and shall protect
each of them against invasion; and, on application of the legislature, or of
the executive, (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic
violence." In the conversation of the Constitutional Convention, republi-
canism was simply what monarchism was not. Madison's definition in
Federalist No. 39 was broad: "we may define a republic to be, or at least
may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers di-
rectly or indirectly from the body of the people, and is administered by
persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or dur-
ing good behavior."' Ample room was left for competing interpretations.
In the last 25 years or so, historians of the founding generation have
developed an appreciation for the rich and complex strain of republican
ideas which were available in the late eighteenth-century and especially
for the Founders' indebtedness to the republican theorists of the Renais-
sance. Like the classic psychologists' test design of the old woman and the
young woman embedded in the same drawing, once historians were taught
to see the elements of classical republicanism in the texts of the founding
generation it became, for a while, hard to see anything else. The themes of
classical republicanism are unsettling. First, they undo the traditional un-
derstanding-made familiar in Carl Becker's classic of 1922, The Decla-
ration of Independence-that the central philosophical influence on the
Founders was Locke. Lockean emphasis on the protection of individual
rights was destabilized as the sole foundation of American constitutional
thought; participation in the political community became freshly impor-
tant.' Second, the themes of classical republicanism position themselves in
t May Brodbeck Professor in the Liberal Arts and Professor of History, University of Iowa.
1. THE FEDERALiST No. 39, at 243-44 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1937).
2. Isaac Kramnick has summarized this aspect of republicanism succinctly:
Man was a political being who realized his telos only when living in a vivere dvile with other
propertied, arms-bearing citizens, in a republic where they ruled and were ruled in turn.
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sharp contrast to democracy: In a scheme in which the political world is
divided into the One, the Few, and the Many, classical republican thought
emphatically favors the propertied Few. This helps explain how the
Founders could be comfortable with a political community which excluded
the propertyless and why in the republic of 1787 only a minority of adults
voted. These undemocratic aspects of 1787 now seem less accidental, more
intentional than they once did. Third, classical republican discourse stands
in a skeptical relationship to commerce and capitalism. Among the Whig
Opposition it had been a language of nostalgia, pitting the Country
against the Court, the rural against the commercial. To the extent that
Americans of the 1780's and 1790's were republican, it becomes impossi-
ble to see them as a rising class of capitalists. Neoprogressive verities, at
least as old as Charles Beard's studies of the economic interests of the
members of the constitutional convention, are left looking for a solid
grounding. In a world constructed by the heirs of civic humanists, Locke
-with his vision of political order emerging from a state of nature in
which men and women are endowed with rights to life, liberty, and prop-
erty-begins to look like an innocent abroad. In J.G.A. Pocock's magiste-
rial work on republicanism, the American Revolution becomes the last of
a series of British revolutions, an episode in the history of the Renaissance
and the early modern era, not the first act in a new Age of
Enlightenment.3
It is this revisionist understanding of the role and significance of classi-
cal republican discourse to which both Sunstein and Michelman have
turned in their contributions to this symposium. Both use the phrase "re-
publican revival" and suggest that the readers' task is to develop an opin-
ion about that revival. Sunstein locates himself among "modern republi-
cans" and searches for "those aspects of republican thought that have the
strongest claim to contemporary support"; he offers to "outline and defend
a particular version of republican thought."' And both essayists find com-
pelling the same aspects of civic humanism: the emphasis on participation
and deliberation in civic life.
Historians are most apt to find disconcerting the claim that we must
now take a position on republicanism-that in Sunstein's terms, we must
"support" it. Historians are more comfortable thinking of themselves as
Behind this republican discourse is a tradition of political philosophy with roots in Aristotle's
Politics, Cicero's Res Publica, Machiavelli, Harrington, Bolingbroke, and the nostalgic coun-
try's virtuous opposition to Walpole and the commercialization of English life. The pursuit of
public good is privileged over private interests, and freedom means participation in civic life
rather than the protection of individual rights from interference.
Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 WM. & MARY
Q. 3, 4-5 (1988). See also Kramnick's apposite footnote to this passage.
3. This point is developed throughout THREE BRITISH REvoLutrioNS: 1641, 1688, 1776 (J.G.A.
Pocock ed. 1980).
4. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
5. Id. at 1541 (emphasis added).
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engaged in the act of uncovering, of eliciting from the discourse of past
societies elements of argumentation which will enable us to understand
these societies in all their distance and strangeness.
Both Sunstein and Michelman disarmingly acknowledge that they want
to retrieve only some aspects of classical republicanism. The classical re-
publican tradition assumed that deliberation was possible only in small
and exclusive communities; the absence of the dependent classes -defined
by race, gender, and property-was essential to the republican view of the
world, not an easily correctable accident. Emphasis on arms-bearing gave
the republican tradition a militaristic core. Emphasis on deliberation did
not necessarily guarantee, as Michelman has acknowledged, "an authentic
consensus .... When everyone is civically virtuous, how is it settled who
gives in, if decision is neither by brute voting nor by domination, whether
brute or subtle?"' Viewed from this perspective, republicanism brings us
uncomfortably close to Rousseau's General Will.
Michelman and Sunstein each seek a discourse which retrieves the civic
virtue and the dedication to deliberation and the common good that was
one side of republicanism and links them to liberalism's respect for indi-
vidual privacy and diversity, abandoning at the same time republicanism's
tendency to homogeneity and the tyranny of the majority as well as liber-
alism's tendency to enshrine private property rights. In a community of
discourse which has in the last few years been unable to escape from de-
mands for original intent argumentation (even when denying that original
intent ought to bind us),7 the argumentative strategy displayed in these
papers is an intriguing departure. For their part, Sunstein and
Michelman turn to the founding generation for a language that offers a
historical pedigree8 for a freshly dynamic understanding of the potential of
American political thought and also provides justification for energetic
public policy choices in the present. Can they find there what they seek?
The uses Sunstein and Michelman make of the work of the founding
generation are compatible, but distinct; they require separate readings.
Both authors counterpose a republican tradition against a "pluralist" one,
with pluralism understood to be the unrestrained competition of private
interests, the side of liberalism which is traditionally contrasted with its
universalist, tolerant side.
Sunstein separates his reflections into two parts, one seeking to locate
6. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REv. 5, 21 (1986). Sunstein concedes this point: "the republican belief in the subordination
of private interests to the public good carries a risk of tyranny and even mysticism." Sunstein, supra
note 4, at 1540.
7. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1985).
8. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1540.
19881 1665
The Yale Law Journal
the elements of republicanism in the argumentation of the founding gener-
ation, and one addressing the implications of republicanism for policy
choices in the present. He hedges his bets by offering a "particular ver-
sion," which he calls "liberal republicanism." This formulation burdens
the reader with the responsibility of distinguishing the debt that each of
the "central principles" which follow owes to the liberal or the republican
side of the Constitution: If "civic virtue" comes from republicanism,
"equality" surely derives from liberalism.' This amalgam seriously mud-
dies the argumentative waters; it is all right to end with a synthesis, but to
start with one and tease out its elements, only to return to it again, is to
invite frustration. 10
Although he acknowledges that the lines are not precise, Sunstein lo-
cates classical republicanism among the Antifederalists.' He is on reason-
ably solid ground in doing this; he is thinking of Gordon Wood's argu-
ment that the construction of the Constitution marks the end of classical
republicanism in America. Nevertheless, his approach should be treated
with caution. Indeed, only a few pages later, Sunstein himself acknowl-
edges the persistence of classical republican thought among Federalists,
particularly in Madisonian conceptions of representation and in the uni-
versal stress on the need for virtue and intelligence among the people as a
whole. 2 The entire revolutionary generation, both Federalists and Anti-
federalists, were heirs of the classical republican tradition. If there is
much in Antifederalist ideology which conveys the republican tradition -
especially its emphasis on small scale politics and intense citizen participa-
tion - there is also a great deal, perhaps even more, in Federalist ideol-
ogy which also embodies republican tradition, including an intense con-
sciousness of the fragility of republics, of the natural inequality of the
social classes, and of the threat to virtue posed by ambition, luxury and
lust, i.e., by effeminacy.
In some moods, Sunstein recognizes that congruities work in both direc-
9. Id. at 1541; see also id. at 1567-69.
10. Sunstein's argument is often opaque. For example, he offers "universalism" as a basic charac-
teristic of republicanism, but goes on to define universalism "in a somewhat idiosyncratic sense" as a
commitment which "amounts to a belief in the possibility of mediating different approaches to politics,
or different conceptions of the pubic good, through discussion and dialogue." Id. at 1554. This is a
definition of a characteristic commitment to "deliberation," perhaps; I see nothing in this sentence
which enriches our understanding of universalism. Yet Sunstein proceeds with the confidence that a
particular characteristic of republicanism has been freshly defined, and embeds this assumption in the
rest of the work.
11. Id. at 1556. In his Harvard Law Review essay of 1986, Michelman also treats republican
thought as "other." "The role," he writes, "is that of a counter-ideology, a normative political vision
to set against the vision believed to have predominated in the thought of the framers and in the
Constitution they framed." Michelman, supra note 6, at 17-18, citing G. STONE, L SEIDMAN, C.
SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTrrTrONAL LAW (1986). Jennifer Nedelsky also draws this sharp
distinction, making the antifederalists proponents of deliberative politics based on civic virtue. Nedel-
sky, Confining Democratic Politics: Antifederalists, Federalists, and the Constitution, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 340 (1982).
12. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1559-61.
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tions: he quotes the leading Antifederalist Patrick Henry on "self-love" as
the "real rock of political salvation""3 and Federalist No. 10 on those
elements of Madisonian thought which echo traditional republican belief.
He also recognizes that a unitary focus on the civic good "depends on a
denial of difference and a belief in transcendence of context."'14 These de-
nials establish a myth of universality and make it difficult if not impossi-
ble for disadvantaged groups-disadvantaged by race, sex, gender, pov-
erty-to press their particular "perspectives and interests.""' In
republican discourse, everyone is represented personally by themselves or
by members-at-large. A reader of Sunstein's essay cannot help but ask
what a progressive like himself is doing in republican company, where, as
Hanna Pitkin has recently reminded us, it is commonly understood, with
Machiavelli, that "Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary to keep her
under, to cuff and maul her."' 6
Frank Michelman also offers a republicanism shorn of its authoritarian
aspects. He acknowledges these aspects clearly and with subtlety, locating
them in the characteristic myth "of the heroic Founder or Legislator...
[which] . . describes an ideal history of the republic in which there was
and will be only one act of political-moral originality . . . ." To make
this myth the core of Republican thought is, of course, to believe that
American republicanism is exceptional. Even though they have been my-
thologized as "Founding Fathers," the men at the Constitutional Conven-
tion are transparently not mythical, and the amendment provisions of the
Constitution are unambivalent about the prospect for continuing acts of
political originality. Michelman seeks to cleanse "We the People" of the
ironies of classical republicanism (not least of which is the fact, as Stanley
N. Katz has recently pointed out, that there is no reference to equality in
either the Constitution or the Bill of Rights),"8 defuse it of its antique
association with arms and violence, and offer an American republicanism
13. Id. at 1558. Bernard Bailyn has recently offered a reading of Antifederalist argumentation
which stresses Antifederalist references to self-interest as the engine that most reliably drives the polit-
ical machine. Bailyn, The Ideological Fulfillment of the American Revolution: A Comment on the
Constitution (unpublished paper, American Historical Association Annual Meeting, Washington,
D.C., Dec. 1987). On both Federalists and Antifederalists as inheritors of republican thought, see
Murrin, The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements
in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816), in THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641,
1688, 1776 (J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1980). On the centrality of republican ideas among Federalists, see
Appleby, The American Heritage: The Heirs and the Disinherited, 74 J. AM. HIST. 798, 801 (1987).
14. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1572.
15. Id.
16. H. PrrKIN, FORTUNE IS A WOMAN: GENDER AND POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF NIccoLo
MACHIAVELLI 152 (1984). Sunstein backs off, however, from his criticism of republican pressure
toward homogeneity: "[a] belief in universalism need not be accompanied by a desire to erase differ-
ences. Indeed, republicans see disagreement as a creative and productive force, highly congenial to and
even an indispensable part of the basic republican faith in political dialogue." Sunstein, supra note 4,
at 1575.
17. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1515 (1988).
18. Katz, The Strange Birth and Unlikely History of Constitutional Equality, 75 J. AM. HIsT.
747 (1988).
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constructed by the Many, not the Few. Instead of Sunstein's "liberal re-
publicanism" Michelman offers "inclusory republicanism."19 He draws
this republicanism not only from classical sources, but also from The Fed-
eralist, or, as he prefers to say, "Publius," especially No. 39, where a
defense of the government as republican is offered with virtually no refer-
ence to its classical republican characteristics. Michelman is interested in
American republicanism as an answer to Rousseau's question: How can a
person be understood to be controlled and yet free?20 Michelman is confi-
dent that a republicanism can be created free of the features that he does
not want it to have.
If the language of civic republicanism will help us in the present to
strengthen those aspects of the political order committed "to political
equality, deliberation, universality and citizenship," more power to the
"republican revival." Yet one is left doubting whether the republicanism
sought by Sunstein and Michelman-especially Sunstein, whose claims
are less cautious-is to be found where they search. Neither essayist rec-
ognizes, for example, that classical republican discourse was a language of
political nostalgia in the 1790's. 21 Neither essayist has addressed the close
connection throughout the early modern period between classical republi-
can thought and the politics of patriarchy; neither has understood liber-
alism as a critique of patriarchy-Locke wrote, after all, in response to
Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha. Patriarchy was comfortably compatible
with classical republicanism: the head of the family represented the family
(and its servants and slaves) in its relationship to the state. A patriarchal
family and a democratizing society were discordant; to undermine patri-
archy, Americans would have to draw on Locke and on Scottish Common
Sense philosophy, with its confidence in the capacity of all humans to
claim happiness. 22 "Do not put such unlimited power in the hands of the
Husbands," wrote Abigail Adams; "Remember, all Men would be tyrants
if they could." 23 Slavery, too, was comfortably compatible with classical
republicanism, and for many of the same reasons. Where property inter-
ests were not deeply threatened by emancipation, liberal republicanism
19. Michelman, supra note 17, at 1504 n.38.
20. Id. at 1500-01.
21. Cohen, Explaining the Revolution: Ideology and Ethics in Mercy Otis Warren's Historical
Theory, 37 WM & MARY Q. 200 (1980); Cohen, Mercy Otis Warren: The Politics of Language and
the Aesthetics of Self, 35 AM. Q. 481 (1983). Lester Cohen's work makes it clear that when women
tried to rely on civic humanism to validate their claims on the republic, they found themselves
marginalized. On this point, see Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America,
13 SIGNs 37, 56 (1987).
22. On patriarchy, see Burrows & Wallace, The American Revolution: The Ideology and Psy-
chology of National Liberation, 6 PERsP. AM. HIsT. 167 (1972).
23. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, Mar. 31, 1776, reprinted in 1 ADAMS FAMILY
CORRESPONDENCE 369-70 (L. H. Butterfield ed. 1963).
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could sustain critics of slavery, as it did, for example, in the Quock
Walker case24 and in efforts to enact gradual manumission laws in New
York and New Jersey. But in the South neither classical republicanism,
with its privileging of patriarchy, nor liberal republicanism, with its
privileging of property rights, could be of much help to slavery's critics;
they would have to turn to Christian concepts of virtue and the equality of
all souls in God's eyes for the foundation of their attack. Among Baptists
and Methodists slaves might find a welcome, and Martin and Gabriel
Prosser found sustenance for rebellion in their Christian faith as well as
in their experiences during the Revolution.25
Traditional republican theory could not help either Jeffersonians or
Federalists think creatively about the place of women in republican soci-
ety. The answer to the conundrum of why Americans of the revolutionary
generation found it so difficult to think about women in revolutionary
terms when the French Left was able to do so lies in part in the extent to
which American political discourse was embedded in its republican
sources. When Elizabeth Cady Stanton and her colleagues wanted to de-
mand a place in the republican polity, republican discourse helped them
little. To sustain the proposition that all are created free, equal, and inde-
pendent, they needed Locke, not Machiavelli.26
Thus patriarchy was embedded in classical republicanism as well as in
monarchy. The habit of dominion in the private sphere accustomed male
heads of households to responsible political choices in the public sector;
the home was "a little commonwealth" in an ironic sense as well as a
straightforward one. To call for a "republican revival" in the abstract is
to skirt the mutually reinforcing aspects of eighteenth century political
culture which sustained republicanism: not only patriarchy in the home,
but also the Calvinism that undergirded concepts of Christian virtue and
the understanding of gentlemanly honor (as opposed to the mob) that sus-
tained civic virtue-those elements which James Oakes has recently
linked to the "profound elitism of classical republicanism.
'27
Both Sunstein and Michelman have located as quintessentially republi-
can a stress on deliberation and process, on the need to balance self-love
by a concern for the public good, on the goal that political decisions also
24. Commonwealth v. Jennison (1783), reprinted in 4 JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN
SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 480-81 (H.T. Catterall ed. 1936) (Massachusetts Supreme Court of Ju-
dicature declared slavery inconsistent with "free and equal" clause of Massachusetts Constitution).
25. On Gabriel's Rebellion, which resulted in the execution of approximately 20 black men in
Richmond, Virginia in the fall of 1800, see G. MULLIN, FLIGHT AND REBELLION: SLAVE RFsss-
TANCE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 140-63 (1972).
26. I have made this point in another form in Kerber, The Republican Ideology of the Revolu-
tionary Generation, 37 AM. Q. 474, 483, 488 (1985). For a cogent argument, which also makes the
Woman Question a test of republicanism's contemporary usefulness, see Hendrik Hartog's vigorous
essay, Imposing Constitutional Traditions, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (1987).
27. Oakes, From Republicanism to Liberalism: Ideological Change and the Crisis of the Old
South, 37 Am. Q. 569 (1985).
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be ethical ones. But in classical republicanism, the deliberators were the
Few, not the Many, and the boundaries of who might participate in that
deliberation were carefully and narrowly drawn. Although Sunstein sees a
sharp contrast between interest-group politics and deliberative politics, he
does not address the likelihood that even after extensive deliberation, the
votes may well reflect some form of self-interest after all. Beware the ab-
stract do-gooder."8 Against corruption, the Founders were likely to offer
their confidence that a society of yeoman farmers, where landed property
was widely distributed, could resist temptation. Moreover, while it is true
that political discourse in the founding generation was infused with im-
plicit understandings of the locus of deliberation, the understandings were
contested. "Theoretically," write W. B. Allen and Gordon Lloyd, "Anti-
federalists conceived of representation as a device to facilitate the direct
expression of the will of the people [and] ... conceived of the deliberation
pre-requisite to sound governing as . . . taking place within the body of
the people."29 Federalists regarded representation as a device to facilitate
deliberation. When the Founders feared corruption, it was not delibera-
tion which they set against it. Nor, indeed, did they normally use the term
"deliberation" to suggest a collective activity. The opening sentence of
Federalist No. 1 is addressed "To the People of the State of New York,"
who, facing an election, by universal male suffrage, of delegates to the
ratifying convention, "are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution
. ... " This deliberation will take place in each individual's own mind,
and will influence the outcome of his vote. Hamilton acknowledges that
his own mind is made up: "I will not amuse you with an appearance of
deliberation, when I have decided." At the very least, the uses of the word
deliberation were various, and did not necessarily privilege a certain form
of shared discussion in particular contexts like town meetings or legisla-
tures. In the end, Sunstein belatedly acknowledges that
most of the great liberal thinkers . . . [also] placed a high premium
on deliberation and discussion, and on the capacity of political dia-
logue to improve outcomes and to undermine unjustified disparities
in power .... In their emphasis on the possibility of forming public
policy through deliberation, on political equality, on citizenship, and
on the salutary effects of publicity, republicanism and liberalism are
at one. °
28. On the reciprocal relationship between participation and authenticity, see Tomkins, The Psy-
chology of Commitment, in THE ANTISLAVERY VANGUARD: NEw ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITIONISTS
270, 279-92 (M. Duberman ed. 1965).
29. THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST 138 (W. B. Allen & G. Lloyd eds. 1985). For a thoughtful
discussion of deliberation, which ends by counterposing deliberation of a large group to corruption
within a small group, see Speech by Melancton Smith, given before the New York Ratifying Conven-
tion (June 20, 1788), reprinted in id. at 175-76.
30. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1567-68.
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What, then, is left of the distinctive characteristics of republicanism to
which Sunstein urges us to turn?"1 Where is the historical pedigree we
were promised?
Neither Sunstein nor Michelman makes fine distinctions between the
republican rhetoric of community and citizenship and similar rhetoric de-
riving from Marx and socialist thought. They happily find in republican
discourse language which sustains participation and deliberation, but they
will not find in it language which supports claims of equal rights of access
to the community of participation and deliberation. For this claim they
will need liberal and socialist language. Indeed, American traditions of
dissent have been sustained by many discourses: the language of Christian
separate salvation; the liberal language that turned to the universalism of
natural law to sustain arguments for equality, toleration, individual rights
and civil liberties; both socialist and commonwealth rhetoric of coopera-
tion and civic virtue; and feminist discourse which insists on the social
construction of relationships hitherto understood to be natural. 2 The
work of Sean Wilentz for the North and James Oakes for the South has
recently made clear the extent to which, in Oakes' words, "republicanism
always functioned as an expression of alienation and opposition.""3 Re-
publican language of all varieties has continued to be central to American
political discourse, particularly of the dissenting left, as has recently been
freshly demonstrated by Sara Evans, Harry Boyte, and James E.
Miller.
3 4
Republican language has been central to American dissent in large part
because it embodies collectivist values while at the same time avoiding the
Marxist language of which Americans have long been skeptical. In turn-
ing to it now for a vantage point from which they can demand a strict
scrutiny for public deliberation, Sunstein and Michelman are themselves
in a long and distinguished tradition of American dissent. It is almost
impossible to find 1780's republicanism nuanced precisely as they would
wish - participation without exclusion, virtue without elitism. Nor is it
possible to find dissenters who really want eighteenth century liberalism
back. Like Sunstein and Michelman, American dissenters traditionally
31. In both systems, "a requirement of neutrality or impersonality . . . plays an important role
. I d. at 1568. Thus Sunstein is brought back to his opening construction of "liberal republican-
ism -a construction which, as I have said, fuses the most appealing elements of the two most promi-
nent political languages of the early republic. "Republican thought, understood in a certain way, is a
prominent aspect of the liberal tradition." Id. at 1569.
32. Recent essays which emphasize diverse sources for the political thought of the early republic
are Kramnick, supra note 2; Bloch, supra note 22; and Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism:
Christianity, Republicanism and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIST. 9
(1987).
33. Oakes, supra note 27, at 555; S. WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEw YORK CITY AND
THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850 (1984).
34. S. EVANS & H. BOYTE, FREE SPACES: THE SOURCES OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN
AMERICA (1986); J. MILLER, DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS: FROM PORT HURON TO THE SIEGE
OF CHICAGO (1987).
1988] 1671
The Yale Law Journal
want liberalism with their republicanism: a large state with participatory
democracy; a neutral state with substantive visions of the public good; mi-
nority rights with majority rule.
It may be useful to have these claims made in the rhetoric of the Foun-
ders because, in practice, theirs are the voices to which we have been
trained to listen. What are the alternatives, after all? To ally oneself with
Marxian dissent is to foreclose a hearing by centrist opinion in America;
to ally oneself with the Antifederalists is to be caught on the losing side. I
remain skeptical of neorepublicanism for its romanticized constructions of
the past. It was not the civic humanists to whom women, blacks, Jews,
and the marginalized groups of modern times have been able to turn for
solutions. At best, and viewed with careful selectivity, neorepublicanism
provides a flying buttress to one wall of the structure of liberalism. If we
are going to repudiate the side of liberalism that privileges the market and
the contract (as the Baby M case has challenged us, most recently and
most directly, to do), we need to repudiate it directly and explicitly; neo-
republicanism helps, but only a little.
I end with the wish that Sunstein and Michelman acknowledge the his-
torical tradition on which they depend: the continuous presence through-
out the history of American dissent of the rhetoric of a commonwealth of
cooperation and civic virtue. It is anachronistic and unnecessary to reach
back over the last two hundred years to claim the republicanism of the
early modern era. Whenever the competitive individualism of bourgeois
liberalism has appeared to be the central problem, American dissenters
have turned to republican themes. Now, I would agree, is such a time.
This resilient republican language fused with major liberal elements has
continued to be central to American political discourse, especially of the
Left. It has always had a radical potential, and Sunstein's and
Michelman's own essays are striking examples of its continuing power.
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